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Abstract In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective
acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form AG:xϕ
reading ‘if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then
they together accept that ϕ’. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic
modal operators. The first kind are public announcements of the form x !ψ , meaning
that the agents learn that ψ is the case in context x . Formulae of the form [x !ψ]ϕ
mean that ϕ is the case after every possible occurrence of the event x !ψ . Semantically,
public announcements diminish the space of possible worlds accepted by agents and
sets of agents. The announcement of ψ in context x makes all ¬ψ-worlds inaccessi-
ble to the agents in such context. In this logic, if the set of accessible worlds of G in
context x is empty, then the agents in G are not functioning as members of x , they
do not identify themselves with x . In such a situation the agents in G may have the
possibility to join x . To model this we introduce here a second kind of dynamic modal
operator of acceptance shifting of the form G:x↑ψ . The latter means that the agents
in G shift (change) their acceptances in order to accept ψ in context x . Semantically,
they make ψ-worlds accessible to G in the context x , which means that, after such
operation, G is functioning as member of x (unless there are no ψ-worlds). We show
that the resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction axioms for
both dynamic operators. In the paper we also show how the logic of acceptance and
its dynamic extension can be used to model some interesting aspects of judgement
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aggregation. In particular, we apply our logic of acceptance to a classical scenario
in judgment aggregation, the so-called ‘doctrinal paradox’ or ‘discursive dilemma’
(Pettit, Philosophical Issues 11:268–299, 2001; Kornhauser and Sager, Yale Law
Journal 96:82–117, 1986).
Keywords Acceptance logic · Public announcement · Belief revision ·
Discursive dilemma · Institutions
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘acceptance’ has been extensively studied in the philosophical literature.
Many authors have emphasized that acceptance and belief are different kinds of men-
tal attitudes (Bratman 1992; Cohen 1992; Tuomela 2000). Whereas beliefs have been
studied for a long time (Hintikka 1962) as representative of doxastic mental states,
acceptances have only been examined since (Stalnaker 1984). An interesting feature
of acceptance is that it is context-dependent (on this point see Engel 1998). In many
cases such contexts are institutional contexts, that is, rule-governed social practices on
the background of which the agents reason. For example, take the case of a game like
Clue. The institutional context is the rule-governed social practice which the agents
conform to in order to be competent players and on the background of which agents
reason. In the context of Clue, an agent accepts that something has happened qua
player of Clue (e.g., the agent accepts that Mrs. Red is the murderer qua player of
Clue). The state of acceptance qua member of an institution is the kind of acceptance
one is committed to when one is “functioning as a member of the institution” (Tuomela
2002). In these situations it may happen that the agent’s acceptances are in conflict
with his beliefs. For instance, a lawyer defending a client in a murder case accepts
qua lawyer that his client is innocent, even if he believes the contrary. There are other
differences between belief and acceptance that are not taken into account in this work.
For instance, according to Hakli (2006), an important difference between belief and
acceptance is that the former aims at truth, whilst the latter depends on an agent’s
decision. More precisely, while a belief that p is an attitude constitutively aiming at
the truth of p, an acceptance of p is the output of “a decision to treat p as true in one’s
utterances and actions” without being necessarily (see Tuomela 2000 for instance)
connected to the actual truth of the proposition.
A similar distinction between belief and acceptance exists at the collective level.
The concept of ‘collective acceptance’ has been studied in the philosophical domain
in opposition to the concepts of common belief and common knowledge, that are pop-
ular in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science (Fagin et al. 1995; van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). Gilbert (1989) and Tuomela (2002) mention two important dif-
ferences between collective acceptance and common belief (or common knowledge):
first, collective acceptance by a set of agents G neither implies common belief of G
nor individual belief of the members of G; second, collective acceptance by G is based
on the identification of the agents in G as members of a certain institution (or group,
team, organization, etc.) and on the fact that the agents in G recognize each other as
members of the same institution (or group, team, organization, etc.). Common belief
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(and common knowledge) does not necessarily entail this aspect of mutual recognition
and identification with respect to a social context. That is, a collective acceptance held
by a set of agents G qua members of a certain institution x is the kind of acceptance
the agents in G are committed to when they are “functioning together as members
of this institution”. For example, in the context of Greenpeace agents (collectively)
accept that their mission is to protect the Earth qua members of Greenpeace. The state
of acceptance qua members of Greenpeace is the kind of acceptance these agents are
committed to when they are functioning together as members of Greenpeace.
Our starting point in this article is the logic of acceptance AL presented in Gaudou
et al. (2008) and Lorini et al. (2009). It has modal operators of acceptance AG:x where
G is a set of agents and x is an institutional context. The formula AG:xϕ reads ‘if the
agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together
accept that ϕ.’ Contrarily to standard epistemic and doxastic logic a set of agents’
acceptances is not necessarily consistent (even in the same context). The formula
AG:x⊥ simply means that the agents in G are not functioning together as members of
institution x : they do not identify themselves with institution x , they are not part of
the institution x . Going beyond the discussion in Lorini et al. (2009), in Sect. 5.4 we
are going to investigate the interaction of the modal operator of acceptance with the
standard KD45 modal operator of belief.
Acceptance logic AL is a normal modal logic with a standard possible worlds
semantics. In Hakli and Negri (2009) a sequent calculus proof system for this logic
was given. In Lorini et al. (2009) it was shown that the logic of classificatory counts-as
by Grossi et al. (2006) can be embedded into AL.
Acceptance logic can be extended by announcements of the form x !ψ to AL, read-
ing ‘ψ is publicly announced in institutional context x’.1 That is, the members of
institution x learn that ψ is true in that context. These announcements are similar
to public announcements studied in dynamic epistemic logics (van Ditmarsch et al.
2007). Similar to the doxastic version of public announcement logic where belief-con-
travening announcements might occur, it might happen here that an agent accepts p
in context x , and ¬p is announced in context x . In formulae, Ai:x p → [x !¬p]Ai:x⊥ is
valid. When an agent i accepts p in the institutional context x and subsequently learns
that ¬p is the case in that context, then he is no longer part of the institutional context
x : i no longer identifies himself with x, i leaves the institution x . As in acceptance
logic the formula Ai:x⊥ is consistent and meaningful, the situation here is not as dra-
matic as in the doxastic version of public announcement logic, where (at least in the
standard doxastic logic KD45) an agent’s beliefs have to be consistent.
So let us examine the situation where Ai:x⊥ holds. Even if i’s acceptances in x
were contradicted by the announcement that took place, i might be prepared to change
his acceptances in order to remain as part of the institution. To model the latter kind
of situation we propose here events of the form i:x↑ψ , meaning that agent i shifts his
acceptances in order to accept ψ in institution x . This can be generalized to group
shifts G:x↑ψ .
1 This was done in a preliminary version of this work, that was presented at the International Workshop
on Knowledge Representation for Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (KRAMAS 2008).
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The resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction axioms
for both announcements and group shifts. This situation contrasts with the logic of
common belief, where no reduction axioms for the common belief operator exist. The
axioms for announcements are standard; those for shifts make use of the universal
modal operator U.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Sect. 2 we present
acceptance logic. Then, in Sect. 3 we extend acceptance logic with public announce-
ments. Section 4 extends our logic again with the operation of acceptance shifting,
that is compared to AGM belief revision operations. After that, Sect. 5 discusses the
relation between acceptance and belief, and offers some perspectives for an extension
of our modal logic of acceptance with doxastic modalities. Section 6 concludes.
2 Acceptance logic
The logic AL (Acceptance logic) was introduced in Gaudou et al. (2008) and Lorini
et al. (2009) for the first time. It allows to express that some agents identify themselves
as members of a certain institution and what agents accept while functioning together
as members of an institution. The principles of AL clarify the relationships between
individual acceptance (acceptances of individual agents) and collective acceptance
(acceptances of groups of agents). We here augment AL by a universal modality that
will be useful when it comes to add the shifting modality.
2.1 Syntax
Assume a finite set I ns = {x1, . . . , x|I ns|} of labels denoting institutional contexts, a
finite set Agt = {i1, . . . , i|Agt|} of labels denoting agents, and a countable set Atm of
atomic formulae. We use 2Agt to denote the set 2Agt\∅.
The set of formulae LAL of acceptance logic AL is defined to be the smallest set
such that
• every p ∈ Atm is a formula;
• if ϕ and ψ are formulae then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ and Uϕ are formulae;
• if ϕ is a formula, G ∈ 2Agt and x ∈ I ns then AG:xϕ is a formula.
For simplicity we sometimes write Ai:xϕ instead of A{i}:xϕ, and Aij:xϕ instead of
A{i,j}:xϕ. The formula AG:xϕ has the following conditional reading ‘if the agents in
the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that
ϕ’. To make our exposition more concise we sometimes read AG:xϕ as ‘the agents in
G accept that ϕ while functioning together as members of institution x’.2
For example, AG1:GreenpeaceprotectEarth expresses that if the agents in G1 identify
themselves as members of Greenpeace then they together accept that their mission is
to protect the Earth; and the formula Ai1:ChurchPopeInfallible expresses that if agent i1
identifies himself as a member of the Catholic Church then he accepts that the Pope
2 Note that in this reading of the operator AG:x the term ‘while’ does not have a temporal connotation.
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is infallible. U is the universal modal operator (Blackburn et al. 2001), and Uϕ reads
‘ϕ is universally true’.
The same agent may accept contradictory propositions in two different contexts.
For example, while functioning as a Catholic, agent i accepts that killing is forbidden,
and while functioning as a soldier i accepts that killing is allowed. Formally this is
written Ai1:Church¬Kill ∧ Ai1:ArmyKill.
The other classical Boolean connectives ∧,→,↔,	 (tautology) and ⊥ (contra-
diction) are defined using ∨ and ¬ in the usual manner. We also use ̂AG:x to denote
the dual of AG:x , i.e., ̂AG:xϕ
def= ¬AG:x¬ϕ.
The formula AG:x⊥ has to be read ‘agents in G are not functioning together as
members of institution x’. This means that we assume that functioning as a mem-
ber of an institution is, at least in this minimal sense, a rational activity. Conversely,
¬AG:x⊥ has to be read ‘agents in G are functioning together as members of institu-
tion x’. Thus, ¬AG:x⊥ ∧ AG:xϕ stands for ‘agents in G are functioning together as
members of institution x and if the agents in G identify themselves with institution x
then they together accept that ϕ’ or simply ‘agents in G accept that ϕ qua members of
institution x’. This is a case of group acceptance. For the individual case, the formula
¬Ai:x⊥ ∧ Ai:xϕ has to be read ‘agent i accepts that ϕ qua member of institution x’.3
2.2 Semantics and axiomatization
We use a standard possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds are understood as in log-
ics of knowledge and of belief (Fagin et al. 1995). Let the set of all couples of non-empty
sets of agents and institutional contexts be  = {G:x | G ∈ 2Agt and x ∈ I ns}.
An acceptance model is a triple 〈W ,A,V〉 where: W is a non-empty set of possible
worlds; A :  → W ×W maps every G:x ∈  to a relation A(G:x) between possible
worlds in W ; and V : Atm → 2W is valuation function associating a set of possible
worlds V(p) ⊆ W to each atomic formula p of Atm.
Instead of A(G:x) we write AG:x , and we use AG:x (w) to denote the set {w′ |
〈w, w′〉 ∈ AG:x }. Just as in epistemic logic an information state is a set of possible
worlds, the set AG:x (w) is the acceptance state of G: the set of worlds that is acceptable
by the agents in G while functioning together as members of institution x .
Given M = 〈W ,A,V〉 and w ∈ W , the couple 〈M, w〉 is a pointed acceptance
model. The satisfaction relation | between formulae of LAL and pointed acceptance
models 〈M, w〉 is defined as usual for atomic propositions, negation and disjunction.
The satisfaction relation for acceptance operators and the universal modal operator
are the following:
3 The condition ‘if the agents of G identify themselves with x’ in the reading of AG:xϕ may sound a bit
artificial to some readers. While it allows for any set of agents (usually called an aggregate in the philosoph-
ical literature) as an argument of the modal operator, it also allows to distinguish elegantly those aggregates
that are constituted groups of members of a certain institution x (for which ¬Ai:x⊥ holds) from those that
are not (for which Ai:x⊥ holds). Readers familiar with dynamic logic may compare this to the program
modality π : there, the formula [π ]ϕ can be read ‘if π is executable then necessarily ϕ after the execution
of π ’, cf. Harel (1984) and Harel et al. (2000).
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Fig. 1 Axiomatisation of acceptance logic
M, w | AG:xϕ iff M, w′ | ϕ for all w′ ∈ AG:x (w)
M, w | Uϕ iff M, w′ | ϕ for all w′ ∈ W
AL validity of a formula ϕ (noted |AL ϕ) is defined as usual.
The axiomatization of AL is presented in Fig. 1. The K-principles are the axioms
and inference rules of the basic modal logic K, and the S5-principles are the axioms
and inference rules of the modal logic S5.
Axiom IncA,U is an inclusion axiom between the acceptance operator and the
universal modality. According to this axiom, if ϕ is universally true then for every set
of agents G and institution x , the agents in G accept ϕ while functioning as members
of institution x .
Axioms 4A* and 5A* express two general hypotheses: a hypothesis of (positive and
negative) introspection for acceptance, and the hypothesis that every group of mem-
bers of an institution accept the validity of acceptances in other institutional contexts.
In particular, if the agents in G (do not) accept that ϕ while functioning together as
members of institution x then, while functioning together as members of institution
y, the agents of every subset H of G accept that agents in G (do not) accept that ϕ.
Example 1 Suppose that three agents i1, i2 and i3 accept that the president of French
Republic is the supreme authority while identifying themselves as French citizens,
and that they do not accept that the Pope is the supreme authority qua French citizens:
Ai1i2i3:FrancePresAuth ∧ ¬Ai1i2i3:FrancePopeAuth. Moreover, they accept that the Pope
is the supreme authority while identifying themselves as Catholics, and they do not
accept that the president of the French Republic is the supreme authority qua Catholics:
¬Ai1i2i3:ChurchPresAuth ∧ Ai1i2i3:ChurchPopeAuth. By Axiom 4A* we infer that, while
identifying himself as a French citizen (resp. as a Catholic), i1 accepts that i1, i2 and
i3 accept that the Pope (resp. the President) is the supreme authority, while identify-
ing themselves as Catholics (resp. as French citizens): Ai1:FranceAi1i2i3:ChurchPopeAuth
∧ Ai1:ChurchAi1i2i3:FrancePresAuth. By Axiom 5A* we infer that, while identifying
himself as a French citizen (resp. as a Catholic), i1 accepts that i1, i2 and i3 do not
accept qua Catholics (resp. qua French citizens) that the president of French Republic
(resp. the Pope) is the supreme authority: Ai1:France¬Ai1i2i3:ChurchPresAuth∧Ai1:Church
¬Ai1i2i3:FrancePopeAuth.
Axiom IncA,G says that if the agents in G accept that ϕ qua members of institu-
tion x then every subset H of G accepts ϕ while functioning together as members
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of institution x . This means that things accepted by the agents in G qua members of
institution x are necessarily accepted by agents in all of G’s subsets with respect to
the same institutional context x . This axiom describes the top down process leading
from G’s collective acceptance to the individual acceptances of G’s members.4
Example 2 Imagine three agents i1, i2, i3 that, qua players of the game Clue, accept
that Mrs. Red is the murderer: ¬Ai1i2i3:Clue⊥ ∧ Ai1i2i3:CluemurderMrsRed. By Axiom
IncA,G we infer that also the two agents i1 and i2, while functioning as Clue players,
accept that Mrs. Red is the murderer: Ai1i2:CluemurderMrsRed.
Axiom Una expresses a unanimity principle according to which the agents in G,
while functioning together as members of institution x , accept that if each of them
individually accepts that ϕ while functioning as member of x , then ϕ is the case. This
axiom describes the bottom up process leading from individual acceptances of every
agent in G to the collective acceptance of the agents in G. Note that the case where
G is a singleton is already covered by Axiom 5A*, from which AG:x (AG:xϕ → ϕ)
follows.
In order to make our axioms valid we impose the following constraints on accep-
tance models, for any worlds w, w′ ∈ W , institutional context x ∈ I ns, and sets of
agents G, H ∈ 2Agt such that H ⊆ G:
(C.1) w′ ∈ AH :y(w) implies AG:x (w) = AG:x (w′)
(C.2) AG:x (w) = ∅ implies AH :x (w) ⊆ AG:x (w)
(C.3) w′ ∈ AG:x (w) implies w′ ∈ ⋃
i∈G
Ai:x (w′)
Axioms 4A* and 5A* together correspond to the constraint C.1; Axiom IncA,G
corresponds to C.2, and Axiom Una to C.3 (in the sense of correspondence theory).
Theorem 3 The axioms and inference rules given in Fig. 1 are sound and complete
with respect to the class of acceptance models satisfying constraints C.1–C.3.
Proof First, it is routine to show that all our axioms are valid.
It is routine, too, to check that all axioms of acceptance logic are in the Sahlqvist
class (Blackburn et al. 2001). Suppose ϕ is consistent. Thus, by Sahlqvist’s complete-
ness theorem there is a model M = 〈W ,A,U ,V〉 and a possible world w in M such that
M, w | ϕ, M satisfies all the three semantic conditions C.1, C.2 and C.3 on the acces-
sibility relations AG:x , and U is an equivalence relation by means of which the operator
U is interpreted. Moreover, by the inclusion Axiom IncA,U , U contains all the other
accessibility relations AG:x . Now consider the submodel Mw = 〈Ww,Aw,Uw,Vw〉
generated from M and w: by the generated submodel property (Blackburn et al. 2001)
we have Mw,w | ϕ. Moreover, Mw satisfies all our constraints on accessibility rela-
tions, and Uw = Ww ×Ww. The latter means that U is interpreted as a universal modal
operator. We can therefore drop Uw from the model, resulting in an acceptance model
satisfying all our constraints. Therefore ϕ is AL satisfiable. unionsq
4 Note that the more general (¬AG:x⊥ ∧ AG:xϕ) → AH :yϕ, if H ⊆ G, would lead to unwanted conse-
quences. The fact that the agents in G accept that the Pope is infallible qua members of the Catholic church
does not entail that every agent in G accepts that the Pope is infallible qua private person.
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Example 4 It follows from Axioms 4A*, 5A* and IncA,G that for H ⊆ G we have
|AL AH :yAG:xϕ ↔ AH :y⊥∨ AG:xϕ and |AL AH :y¬AG:xϕ ↔ AH :y⊥∨¬AG:xϕ.
Remark One may think that the following principle would be desirable in acceptance
logic: ¬AG:x⊥ → ¬AH :x⊥ if H ⊆ G. This principle expresses a property of mono-
tonicity about institution membership, and was considered in our previous work on
acceptance logic (Lorini et al. 2009; Gaudou et al. 2008). According to it, if the agents
in G are functioning together as members of the institution x then, for every subset H
of G, the agents in H are also functioning together as members of the institution x .
The statement ‘the agents in G function together as members of institution x’ means
for us that ‘the agents in G identify and recognize each other as members of x’. Thus,
the previous principle can be rephrased as follows: if the agents in a set G identify
and recognize each other as members of institution x then, for every subset H of G,
the agents in H also identify and recognize each other as members of x . While such
a principle might be reasonable for large groups, we have preferred not to include it
in the axiomatization of AL because in some situations the agents in a set G function
as members of a certain institution x only when they are together, and do not function
as members of this institution if they are alone. That is, the agents in G jointly func-
tion as members of x , but they don’t do so individually. For example, eleven agents
1, 2, . . . , 11 jointly function as members of a football team, but they don’t do that indi-
vidually. In this sense, the agents in {1, 2, . . . , 11} identify themselves as members
of the football of the team only when they are together in such a way that each agent
in {1, 2, . . . , 11} considers himself and the others as parts of the same collectivity. In
a similar way one might argue that several people identify themselves as members
of the same political movement only when they are together in such a way that each
person considers himself and the other people as parts of the same collectivity.
Such a principle also would also pose some technical difficulties for our enter-
prise: the semantical principle corresponding to it would not be preserved under the
acceptance shifts that we are going to introduce in Sect. 4.
2.3 Scenario I: a static version of the discursive dilemma
In the recent years many researchers in philosophy, computer science and political sci-
ences have been working on the issue of judgement aggregation (e.g., Pauly and van
Hees 2006; List and Pettit 2002; Goldman 2004; List 2005). The problem is: how can
a group of individuals aggregate the group members’ individual judgements on some
interconnected propositions into corresponding collective judgements on these prop-
ositions? Such problems occur in different social and legal contexts like committees,
legislatures, judiciaries and expert panels.
Our aim in this section is to show that our logic of acceptance is a formal framework
in which some important aspects of judgement aggregation can be modelled. As we
show, it is a particular instance of the problem of explaining how collective acceptance
of the members of a certain group in an institutional context x about a certain fact ϕ
is created from the individual acceptances in x of the members of the same group.
We consider a well-know problem in judgement aggregation called ‘doctrinal para-
dox’ or ‘discursive dilemma’ (Pettit 2001; Kornhauser and Sager 1986). The scenario
123 [930]
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Table 1 Doctrinal paradox
act obl lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) lia
Judge 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge 2 Yes No Yes No
Judge 3 No Yes Yes No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No/Yes
of the discursive dilemma is a three-member court which has to judge whether a defen-
dant is liable for a breach of contract. According to the legal doctrine, the defendant is
liable (lia) if and only if he did a certain action (act) and he had a contractual obligation
not to do this action (obl). This is expressed in propositional logic by the connection
rule
CR = lia ↔ (act ∧ obl)
It is supposed that all the judges accept CR.
The three judges use majority rule to decide on this issue. The opinions of the
three judges are given in Table 1. Judge 1 says act ∧ obl and, by the connection rule,
he accepts lia. Judge 2 says act ∧ ¬obl and, by the connection rule, he rejects lia.
Finally, judge 3 says ¬act ∧ obl and, by the connection rule, he rejects lia. If the three
judges apply a majority rule on each proposition then they face a paradox. Indeed, a
majority expresses act, a majority expresses obl, and all accept the connection rule
lia ↔ (act ∧ obl). But the majority rejects lia. Thus, when majority voting is applied
to each single proposition it yields an inconsistent collective set of judgements (see
the last row in Table 1). This inconsistency occurs even though the sets of judgements
of the individual judges are all consistent.
Let us now show how the discursive dilemma can be formalized in the logic of accep-
tance. We here suppose that when judges speak they communicate acceptances—for
an alternative view see Sect. 5.3.
We first suppose that 1, 2 and 3 qua judges of the court accept the connection rule:
A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥. Then let us suppose that judge 1 announces that he accepts
act ∧ obl, judge 2 announces that he accepts act ∧ ¬obl, and judge 3 announces that
he accepts ¬act ∧ obl. Letting
Pr = A1:crt(act ∧ obl) ∧ A2:crt(act ∧ ¬obl) ∧ A3:crt(¬act ∧ obl)
the judges’ announcements have the effect A123:crtPr. Finally, the three judges use
a majority rule to decide whether the defendant is liable. We introduce the majority
principle as a non-logical axiom for the specific set of agents {1, 2, 3}.5 The stan-
dard solutions to the discursive dilemma apply the majority principle either to the
premises or to the conclusions. We can capture both solutions in our logic. Let us
abbreviate
5 See Lorini et al. (2009) for a discussion of the majority rule and related paradoxes in the logic of accep-
tance, and for an analysis of other kinds of aggregation rules (such as dictatorship).
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PMaj =
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Ai :crtact ∧ A j :crtact) → act) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Ai :crt¬act ∧ A j :crt¬act) → ¬act) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Ai :crtobl ∧ A j :crtobl) → obl) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j




i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Ai :crt lia ∧ A j :crt lia) → lia) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Ai :crt¬lia ∧ A j :crt¬lia) → ¬lia)
Under the premise-based procedure, majority votes are taken on the two issues obl
and act (the premises), but not on the issue lia (the conclusion), and the final judgement
on the issue lia is derived by means of the connection rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) (see e.g.
Pigozzi 2006; Pettit 2001 for a discussion of premise-based procedure in judgement
aggregation). In the logic of acceptance premise-based procedure consists in applying
the hypotheses Pr together with PMaj. It is straightforward to prove the following:
Proposition 1 The formula A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr ∧ PMaj) → A123:crt lia is provable
in AL.
Proof
1. A123:crtPr → A123:crt(A1:crtact ∧ A2:crtact)
2. A123:crtPMaj → A123:crt((A1:crtact ∧ A2:crtact) → act)
3. A123:crt(Pr ∧ PMaj) → A123:crtact from 1, 2
4. A123:crtPr → A123:crt(A1:crtobl ∧ A3:crtobl)
5. A123:crtPMaj → A123:crt((A1:crtobl ∧ A3:crtobl) → obl)
6. A123:crt(Pr ∧ PMaj) → A123:crtobl from 4, 5
7. A123:crtCR → A123:crt(lia ↔ (act ∧ obl))
8. A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr ∧ PMaj) → A123:crt lia from 3, 6, 7
unionsq
That is, by applying the premise-based procedure, the three judges accept that the
defendant is liable. As discussed in Pettit (2001), the premise-based procedure in
judgement aggregation captures the deliberative democratic principle that a collective
decision on a certain issue by a certain group of agents G should be based on reasons
that are collectively accepted and on which all agents in the group G agree.
Under the conclusion-based procedure, a majority vote is taken only on lia, but not
on the issues obl and act. In the logic of acceptance, the conclusion-based procedure
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consists in applying the hypothesis Pr together with CMaj. Again, it is straightforward
to prove the following:
Proposition 2 The formula A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr ∧ CMaj) → A123:crt¬lia is provable
in AL.
Proof
1. A123:crt⊥ → A123:crt¬lia
2. A123:crtPr → A123:crtA2:crt(act ∧ ¬obl)
3. (A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crt(A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥)
with Axioms 4A* and 5A*
4. A123:crt(A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crtA2:crtCR with Axiom IncA,G
5. (A123:crt(Pr ∧ CR) ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crtA2:crt¬lia from 2, 3, 4
6. A123:crtPr → A123:crtA3:crt(¬act ∧ obl)
7. A123:crt(A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crtA3:crtCR with Axiom IncA,G
8. (A123:crt(Pr ∧ CR) ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crtA3:crt¬lia from 3, 6, 7
9. A123:crtCMaj → A123:crt((A2:crt¬lia ∧ A3:crt¬lia) → ¬lia)
10. (A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr ∧ CMaj) ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) → A123:crt¬lia from 5, 8, 9
11. A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr ∧ CMaj) → A123:crt¬lia from 1, 10
unionsq
That is, by applying conclusion-based procedure, the three judges accept that the
defendant is not liable.
From these two propositions it immediately follows that A123:crt(CR∧Pr∧PMaj∧
CMaj) → A123:crt⊥. Therefore:
Proposition 3 The formula A123:crt(CR∧Pr ∧PMaj ∧CMaj)∧¬A123:crt⊥ is incon-
sistent in AL.
In Sect. 3.3 we will model the discursive dilemma in a dynamic version of the logic
of acceptance. After introducing public announcements we will provide a dynamic
characterization of the discursive dilemma.
3 Public announcements
In a natural way, acceptance is obtained through communication: when a group accepts
that one of its members i accepts that ϕ then this is often the result of a speech act per-
formed by i. Acceptance is therefore closely related to the notion of commitment that
has been studied in agent communication languages (Fornara and Colombetti 2002;
Verdicchio and Colombetti 2003; Singh 1998).
In this section we will suppose that the judgements of the three judges are aggre-
gated in the context of a dialogue. The three judges first express their opinions about
the two issues act and obl. Then they find an agreement about the connection rule
lia ↔ (act ∧ obl).
In order to model this we study the combination of AL with a rather simple com-
municative act, viz. announcements as defined in public announcement logic (PAL)
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(Plaza 1989). Basically, when ψ is publicly announced then all agents learn that ψ is
true. We adopt Kooi’s variant of the original PAL truth condition (Kooi 2007). The
latter does not require announcements to be truthful and does not eliminate possible
worlds where the announcement is false, but only makes them inaccessible.
3.1 Language and models
The language LDAL (dynamic acceptance logic) is an extension of LAL by formulae
of the form [x !ψ]ϕ, where x ∈ I ns and ψ and ϕ are formulae, that are read ‘ϕ holds
after the public announcement of ψ in institutional context x’. Intuitively, it expresses
that the whole set of agents learn that ψ is the case in institutional context x . In conse-
quence their acceptances qua members of x are updated. This is similar to the notion
of expansion studied in AGM belief revision theory (Alchourrón et al. 1985); see Sect.
4.5 for a more detailed comparison.
Announcements are also interpreted in pointed acceptance models M = 〈W ,A,V〉.
Their truth condition is:
〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]ϕ iff 〈W ,Ax !ϕ,V〉, w | ϕ
with:
Ax !ψG:y(w) =
{AG:y(w), if y = x;
AG:y(w) ∩ ‖ψ‖M , if y = x .
where, as usual, ‖ψ‖M = {w ∈ W | M, w | ψ} is the extension of ψ in M, i.e., the
set of worlds of M where ψ is true.
In words, the agents take into account the event x !ψ by eliminating all worlds where
ψ is false from their acceptance state w.r.t. x .6
Proposition 4 If M = 〈W ,A,V〉 is an acceptance model then Mx !ψ = 〈W ,Ax !ϕ,V〉
is an acceptance model.
Proof Assume H ⊆ G.
(1) Assume w2 ∈ Ax !ψH :y(w1).
Assume z = x . Then Ax !ψG:z = AG:z which immediately implies Ax !ψG:z (w1) =
Ax !ψG:z (w2), because M satisfies constraint C.1.
Now assume z = x . And also assume w3 ∈ Ax !ψG:z (w1). Then w3 ∈ AG:z(w1),
which implies that w3 ∈ AG:z(w2), because M satisfies constraint C.1. Then w3 ∈
Ax !ψG:z (w2). Therefore, Ax !ψG:z (w1) ⊆ Ax !ψG:z (w2). And by a symmetric argument,
we also show that Ax !ψG:z (w2) ⊆ Ax !ψG:z (w1). Therefore, Ax !ψG:z (w1) = Ax !ψG:z (w2).
Therefore, Mx !ψ satisfies constraint C.1.
6 Note that differently from the standard version of public announcement logic à la Plaza (1989) it is not
the worlds that are eliminated, but only the arrows labelled by x leading to worlds where ψ is false. This is
exactly as in Kooi’s version of PAL (Kooi 2007).
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(2) Assume Ax !ψG:y(w1) = ∅ and w2 ∈ Ax !ψH :y(w1).
Assume y = x . Then Ax !ψI :y = AI :y for all I ∈ 2Agt. Then w2 ∈ Ax !ψG:y(w1),
because M satisfies constraint C.2. Therefore, Ax !ψH :y(w1) ⊆ Ax !ψG:y(w1).
Now assume y = x . Then w2 ∈ AH :y(w1) ∩ ‖ψ‖M . Note that we also have
AG:y(w1) = ∅. Therefore, w2 ∈ AG:y(w1), because M satisfies constraint C.2.
All together implies w2 ∈ Ax !ψG:y(w1). Therefore, Ax !ψH :y(w1) ⊆ Ax !ψG:y(w1).
Therefore Mx !ψ satisfies constraint C.2.
(3) Assume w2 ∈ Ax !ψG:y(w1).
Assume y = x . Then, again, Ax !ψI :y = AI :y for all I ∈ 2Agt, which immediately
implies w2 ∈ Ax !ψi:y (w1) for some i ∈ G, because M satisfies constraint C.3.
Now assume y = x . Then w2 ∈ AG:y(w1)∩‖ψ‖M , which implies w2 ∈ Ai:y(w1)
for some i ∈ G, because M satisfies constraint C.3. Therefore, w2 ∈ Ax !ψi:y (w1)
for some i ∈ G.
Therefore Mx !ψ satisfies constraint C.3.
Items 1, 2 and 3 together imply that Mx !ψ is an acceptance model. unionsq
Validity of a formula ϕ is defined as before. For example, both [x !p]Aij:x p and
Aij:x¬p → [x !p]Aij:x⊥ are valid, for every p ∈ Atm and i, j ∈ Agt. The first simply
means that the agents accept p in x after the announcement of p in institutional context
x . The second means that the set of agents {i, j} quits context x after the announcement
of a fact that contradicts what is previously accepted in this context.
3.2 Reduction axioms
Note that, contrarily to PAL, the modified accessibility relations for collective accep-
tances are not determined by the modified accessibility relations for individuals.
Instead, they are first-class citizens here, and are changed on their own. That is why
DAL has reduction axioms for all cases (individual and collective acceptance). This
is just as for public announcement logic without common belief, and contrasts with
logics having the common belief operator, for which such axioms do not exist (Baltag
and Moss 2004; Kooi and van Benthem 2004).
Theorem 5 The following equivalences are valid.
(RA.1) [x !ψ]p ↔ p
(RA.2) [x !ψ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[x !ψ]ϕ
(RA.3) [x !ψ](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ ([x !ψ]ϕ1 ∧ [x !ψ]ϕ2)
(RA.4) [x !ψ]AG:yϕ ↔ AG:y[x !ψ]ϕ (if y = x)
(RA.5) [x !ψ]AG:yϕ ↔ AG:y(ψ → [x !ψ]ϕ) (if y = x)
Proof
RA.1: 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]p
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | p
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iff w ∈ V(p)
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | p.
RA.2: 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]¬ϕ
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ¬ϕ
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ϕ
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]ϕ
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | ¬[x !ψ]ϕ.
RA.3: 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ϕ1 and 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ϕ2
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]ϕ1 and 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]ϕ2
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]ϕ1 ∧ [x !ψ]ϕ2.
RA.4: We show that the equivalent formula
¬[x !ψ]AG:yϕ ↔ ¬AG:y[x !ψ]ϕ
is valid:
〈W ,A,V〉, w | ¬[x !ψ]AG:yϕ
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]¬AG:yϕ by RA.3
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ¬AG:yϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ Ax !ψG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ because y = x
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | [x !ψ]¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ¬[x !ψ]ϕ by RA.3
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ¬AG:x [x !ψ]ϕ.
RA.5: We show that the equivalent formula
¬[x !ψ]AG:yϕ ↔ ¬AG:y(ψ → [x !ψ]ϕ)
is valid:
〈W ,A,V〉, w | ¬[x !ψ]AG:yϕ
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | [x !ψ]¬AG:yϕ by RA.3
iff 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w | ¬AG:yϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ Ax !ψG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ and 〈W ,Ax !ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ
because y = x
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ and 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | [x !ψ]¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:y(w) s.t. 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ ∧ ¬[x !ψ]ϕ by RA.3
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | ¬AG:y(ψ → [x !ψ]ϕ). unionsq
The equivalences RA.1–RA.5 are called reduction axioms because they allow to
rewrite every formula by successively eliminating the dynamic operators, ending up
with a formula that contains none.
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Example 6 Using the rule of replacement of equivalents (that preserves validity), the
formula [x !p]Ai1i2:x p is successively rewritten as follows:
Aij:x (p → [x !p]p) (by RA.5)
Aij:x (p → p) (by RA.1)
The latter is valid in every normal modal logic, and therefore also in acceptance logic
AL. It follows that the initial formula is valid.
The formula Aij:x¬p → [x !p]Aij:x⊥ is successively rewritten as follows:
Aij:x¬p → Aij:x (p → [x !p]⊥) (by RA.5)
Aij:x¬p → Aij:x (p → ⊥) (by RA.1)
Again, the latter is valid, and by Theorem 5 the initial formula is so, too.
The next example illustrates that announcements are not commutative.
Example 7 The formula [x !p][x !¬AG:x p]AG:x⊥ is rewritten as follows:
[x !p]AG:x (¬AG:x p → ⊥) (by RA.1 and RA.5)
[x !p]AG:x AG:x p (by standard modal principles)
AG:x (p → [x !p]AG:x p) (by RA.5)
AG:x (p → AG:x (p → p)) (by RA.1 and RA.5)
The latter is a theorem of every normal modal logic, and thus of AL, too.
Now let us permute the two announcements. Then the formula [x !¬AG:x p][x !p]
AG:x⊥ is rewritten as follows:
[x !¬AG:x p]AG:x (p → ⊥) (by RA.1 and RA.5)
AG:x (¬AG:x → (p → ⊥)) (by RA.1 and RA.5)
The latter can be falsified in AL.
Just as in public announcement logic, it can be shown that when ψ and ψ ′ are
positive formulae then [x !ψ][x !ψ ′]ϕ ↔ [x !ψ ′][x !ψ]ϕ.7
3.3 Scenario II: a dynamic version of the discursive dilemma
Let us go back to the discursive dilemma illustrated in Sect. 2.3. The scenario has a
dynamic aspect that is not reflected in the ‘static’ logic AL. We here show how solu-
tions to the dilemma can be modelled in our extension of AL by announcements. The
idea is to take a diachronic view by supposing that the judgements of the three judges
7 Positive AL formulae are recursively defined to be the smallest set such that:
• every Boolean formula is a positive AL formula;
• if ϕ and ϕ′ are positive AL formulae then ϕ ∨ ϕ′, ϕ ∧ ϕ′ and AG:xϕ are positive AL formulae.
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are aggregated in the context of a conversation that is organized in the following two
phases:
• First, each judge expresses his opinions about the two issues act and obl, and
majority voting is applied in order to decide whether the defendant did the action
(act) and whether he had a contractual obligation not to do this action (obl).
• Then, the rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) is announced and applied by the three judges in
order to decide whether the defendant is liable (lia).
Let the premisses Pr = lia ↔ (act ∧ obl), the majority rule for premisses PMaj
and the majority rule for conclusions CMaj be defined as in Sect. 2.3. Then we get:
Proposition 5 The formula
A123:crt(PMaj ∧ CMaj) ∧ [crt!Pr] [crt!CR] (A123:crt lia ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥)
is satisfiable in our extension of AL by announcements.
Proposition 5 shows that when taking a diachronic perspective on the problem at
stake then the so-called premise-based procedure that we discussed in Sect. 2.3 can
be naturally recast in our extension of AL by means of a sequence of announcements.
Indeed, in our extension of AL by announcements we might consistently assume that
the three judges qua members of the court accept that the defendant is liable, after
the following two events have occurred in sequence: first, 1 announces in the context
of the court that he accepts both act and obl, 2 announces that he accepts act and
rejects obl, and 3 announces that he rejects act and accepts obl; then the connection
rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) is announced in the context of the court. Thus, by making the
discursive dilemma dynamic we did not incur any inconsistency.
Under which conditions the previous formula becomes a validity of our extension
of AL by announcements? When do the three judges accept that the defendant is lia-
ble, after having announced their opinions in the context of the court and after the
connection rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) is announced? The following Proposition 6 shows
that this is the case when ̂A123:crt(act ∧ obl ∧ lia ∧ Pr) holds.
Proposition 6 The formula
A123:crt(PMaj ∧ CMaj) ∧ ̂A123:crt(act ∧ obl ∧ lia ∧ Pr)
→ [crt!Pr] [crt!CR] (A123:crt lia ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥)
is valid in our extension of AL by announcements.
According to Proposition 6, a sufficient condition which ensures that the three
judges accept lia is that before the announcements of Pr and CR there exists at least
one world accepted by three judges in which the defendant is liable.8
8 One may prove Proposition 6 by showing that
A123:crtPMaj ∧ ̂A123:crt(act ∧ obl ∧ lia ∧ Pr) → [crt!Pr] (A123:crt(act ∧ obl) ∧ A3:crt⊥
∧̂A123:crt(act ∧ obl ∧ lia))
is a theorem of the extension of AL by announcements.
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One may note that this solution to the discursive dilemma is just a different way to
express formally the so-called premise-based procedure that we discussed in Sect. 2.3.
4 Acceptance shifting
According to our semantics, Ai:x¬p → [x !p]Ai:x⊥ is valid in our extension of AL by
announcements (as illustrated by Example 6). In words, agents quit any institutional
context that is restricted by a formula contradicting their acceptances. There is no
means for i to get out of that situation and reintegrate the institutional context x .
To be able to model reintegration we will define another operation that updates
agents’ acceptances in a way different from public announcements. Semantically, all
the arrows labeled G:x are replaced by new arrows to ψ-worlds. We call this new
operation acceptance shifting. We compare this operation with AGM belief revision
in the end of the section.
4.1 Syntax and semantics
The language LDAL is extended by formulae of the form [G:x↑ψ]ϕ, where G ∈
2Agt, x ∈ I ns and ψ and ϕ are formulae. [G:x↑ψ]ϕ is read ‘ϕ holds after the shifting
of G to ψ in institutional context x’.
Intuitively, this operator expresses that agents in G start to accept ψ in the institu-
tional context x , so their acceptances, qua members of x , are updated.
The semantics of this new operator is given by the following clause:
〈W ,A,V〉, w | [H :x↑ψ]ϕ iff 〈W ,AH :x↑ψ,V〉, w | ϕ
with:




AG:y(w), if y = x or G ∩ H = ∅;
‖ψ‖M , if y = x and G ⊆ H ;
∅, if y = x, G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H.
In words, a shift of the agents in H to ψ in context x has the following effects:
• The acceptance state of all groups of members of an institution y different from x
remains unchanged;
• for every G, if G and H have an empty intersection then the acceptance state of
group G of members of institution x remains unchanged;
• the acceptance state of group H of members of institution x is set to the extension
of ψ ;
• for every G, if G is a subset of H then the acceptance state of group G of members
of institution x is set to the extension of ψ , too;
• for every G, if G and H share at least one agent but G is not a subset of H then
the acceptance state of group G of members of institution x is set to the empty set.
The last condition looks quite radical. However, consider the case where the agents
i1 and i2 accept that p qua members of institution x , i.e. Ai1i2:x p. By Axiom IncA,G ,
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it follows that both i1 and i2 individually accept that p qua members of institution x ,
i.e. Ai1:x p ∧ Ai2:x p. Now suppose i1 shifts his acceptances to ¬p; what should be the
acceptance state of {i1, i2}? It seems that as i1 and i2 now (publicly) disagree about the
status of p, they cannot be said to be a constituted group any more. This justifies setting
A{i1}:x↑¬p{i1,i2}:x (w) = ∅. The same argument can be made for any three groups G1, G2, G3
such that G3 = G1 ∩ G2 = ∅.
Theorem 8 If M = 〈W ,A,V〉 is an acceptance model then M H :x↑ψ = 〈W ,AH :x↑ψ,
V〉 is an acceptance model.
Proof Assume I ⊆ G.
(1) Assume w2 ∈ AH :x↑ψI :y (w1).
Assume z = y or G∩H = ∅. Then AH :x↑ψG:z = AG:z , which immediately implies
AH :x↑ψG:z (w1) = AH :x↑ψG:z (w2).
Assume z = x, G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H . Then AH :x↑ψG:z = ∅, which also
immediately implies AH :x↑ψG:z (w1) = AH :x↑ψG:z (w2).
Now assume z = x and G ⊆ H . And also assume w3 ∈ AH :x↑ψG:z (w2). Then
w3 ∈ ‖ψ‖M , which implies w3 ∈ AH :x↑ψG:z (w1). Therefore, AH :x↑ψG:z (w2) ⊆
AH :x↑ψG:z (w1). And by a symmetric argument we show that AH :x↑ψG:z (w1) ⊆
AH :x↑ψG:z (w2).
Therefore, M H :x↑ψ satisfies constraint C.1.
(2) Assume AH :x↑ψG:y (w1) = ∅ and w2 ∈ AH :x↑ψI :y (w1).
Assume y = x or G ∩ H = ∅. Then AH :x↑ψG:y = AG:y and AH :x↑ψI :y = AI :y ,
which implies AH :x↑ψI :y (w1) ⊆ AH :x↑ψG:y (w1), because M satisfies C.2.
Assume y = x, G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H . Then AH :x↑ψG:y (w1) = ∅, which
contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore, this assumption is false.
Now assume y = x and G ⊆ H . Then w2 ∈ ‖ψ‖M , which implies w2 ∈
AH :x↑ψI :y (w1), because I ⊆ H . Therefore, AH :x↑ψI :y (w1) ⊆ AH :x↑ψG:y (w1).
Therefore M H :x↑ψ satisfies constraint C.2.
(3) Assume w2 ∈ AH :x↑ψG:y (w1).
Assume y = x or G ∩ H = ∅. Then AJ :x↑ψG:y = AJ :y for all J ∈ 2Agt, which
implies w2 ∈ AH :x↑ψi:y (w1) for some i ∈ G, because M satisfies C.3.
Assume y = x, G = H, G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H . Then AH :x↑ψG:y (w1) = ∅,
which contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore, this assumption is false.
Now assume y = x and G ⊆ H . Then w2 ∈ ‖ψ‖M , which implies w2 ∈
AH :x↑ψi:y (w1) for all i ∈ G.
Therefore M H :x↑ψ satisfies constraint C.3.
Therefore M H :x↑ψ is an acceptance model. unionsq
Remark One might observe that our operation of acceptance shifting H :x↑ψ is quite
permissive because (1) all the worlds in the model which satisfy ψ are accepted by H
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afterwards, and because (2) all other groups G properly intersecting H are ‘kicked’
out of the institution x . However, it seems that in the framework of acceptance models
this is the only natural way of preserving the structural constraints of the models: as
to (1), a less permissive operation would require models to contain more information,
such as a counterpart of the epistemic entrenchment orderings that are used in AGM
belief revision (Gärdenfors 1988); as to (2), as we have said above, if we did not set
the accessibility relation for groups G such that G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H to the empty
set, then inclusion constraint (C.2) would not be preserved for the group G ∩ H .
Just as for announcements, we also have reduction axioms for acceptance shifting.
Theorem 9 The following equivalences are valid in DAL.
(RS.1) [G:x↑ψ]p ↔ p
(RS.2) [G:x↑ψ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[G:x↑ψ]ϕ
(RS.3) [G:x↑ψ](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ ([G:x↑ψ]ϕ1 ∧ [G:x↑ψ]ϕ2)
(RS.4) [G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ ↔ AH :y[G:x↑ψ]ϕ if x = y or G ∩ H = ∅
(RS.5) [G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ ↔ 	 if x = y, G ∩ H = ∅ and H ⊆ G
(RS.6) [G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ ↔ U(ψ → [G:x↑ψ]ϕ) if x = y and H ⊆ G
(RS.7) [G:x↑ψ]Uϕ ↔ U[G:x↑ψ]ϕ
Proof Soundness of RS.1–RS.3 is shown in exactly the same way as for RA.1–RA.3
(Theorem 5). Soundness of RS.4 is shown in a very similar way as for RA.4. So we
leave them as an exercise to the reader.
RS.5: Assume x = y, G = H, G ∩ H = ∅ and H ⊆ G.
〈W ,A,V〉, w | [G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ
iff 〈W ,AG:x↑ψ,V〉, w | AH :yϕ
iff for all w′ ∈ AG:x↑ψH :y (w) we have 〈W ,AG:x ,V〉, w′ | ϕ.
The latter is true since by hypothesis, AG:x↑ψH :y (w) = ∅.
RS.6: Assume x = y and G ⊆ H . We show that the equivalent formula
¬[G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ ↔ ¬U(ψ → [G:↑ψ]ϕ)
is valid.
〈W ,A,V〉, w | [G:x↑ψ]AH :yϕ
iff 〈W ,AG:x↑ψ,V〉, w | ¬AH :yϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ AG:x↑ψH :y (w) such that 〈W ,AG:x↑ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ W such that 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ and 〈W ,AG:x↑ψ,V〉, w′ | ¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ W such that 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ and 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | [G:x↑ψ]¬ϕ
iff there is w′ ∈ W such that 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ and 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ¬[G:x↑ψ]ϕ,
by RS.3,
iff there is w′ ∈ W such that 〈W ,A,V〉, w′ | ψ ∧ ¬[G:x↑ψ]ϕ
iff 〈W ,A,V〉, w | ¬U(ψ → ¬[G:x↑ψ]ϕ).
RS.7:
〈W ,A,V〉, w | [G:x↑ψ]Uϕ
iff 〈W ,AG:x↑ψ,V〉, w′ | ϕ for all w′ ∈ W
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iff 〈W ,A, w′〉 | [G:x↑ψ]ϕ for all w′ ∈ W
iff 〈W ,A, w〉 | U[G:x↑ψ]ϕ unionsq
4.2 Success and preservation
It is well-known that not all public announcements are successful (van Ditmarsch
et al. 2007; van Ditmarsch and Kooi 2006). To witness, consider announcement of the
Moore sentence, which in terms of acceptance is p ∧ ¬AG:x p: the formula [x !(p ∧
¬AG:x p)] ¬(p ∧ ¬AG:x p) is a theorem of our extension of AL by announcements.
We now show that shifts behave in a similar way.
Example 10 The formula [G:x↑p]AH :yAG:x p is valid. To show it we consider three
cases.
First, assume y = x or G ∩ H = ∅. Then this formula is successively rewritten as
follows:
AH :y[G:x↑p]AG:x p (by RS.4)
AH :yU( p → [G:x↑p]p) (by RS.6)
AH :yU( p → p) (by RS.1)
The latter is a theorem of every normal modal logic, and therefore also of acceptance
logic AL. It follows that the initial formula is valid, too.
Second, assume y = x and G ⊆ H . Then this formula is successively rewritten as
follows:
U( p → [G:x↑p]AG:x p) (by RS.6)
U( p → U(p → [G:x↑p]p)) (by RS.6)
U( p → U(p → p)) (by RS.1)
Again, the latter is a theorem of AL, which means that the initial formula is a theorem
of DAL.
The third case is y = x, G ∩ H = ∅ and G ⊆ H . It is easy to see that the same
conclusion follows again, now by RS.5.
Is shifting always successful, in the sense that |DAL [G:x↑ψ]ψ? The answer is
negative, as illustrated by the following result.
Proposition 7 The formula AG:x⊥ → [G ′:x↑AG:x⊥]¬AG:x⊥ is DAL valid, for
every G, G ′ such that G ⊆ G ′.
Proof Suppose G ⊆ G ′. The right hand side [G ′:x↑AG:x⊥]¬AG:x⊥ is successively
equivalent to ¬[G ′:x↑AG:x⊥]AG:x⊥ (by RS.2), and by RS.6 to ¬U(AG:x⊥ →
[G ′:x↑AG:x ] ⊥). The latter is by RS.1 equivalent to ¬U(AG:x⊥ → ⊥). Replac-
ing the right hand side of the original formula by the above we obtain AG:x⊥ →
¬U(AG:x⊥ → ⊥), which is AL valid (because U is a S5 modality). unionsq
It follows that [G:x↑ψ]AG:xψ is invalid, too.
The last example gives preservation conditions under shifts.
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Example 11 The formula ϕ → [G:x↑ψ]ϕ is DAL valid if ϕ is Boolean.
4.3 Scenario III: changing paradigm
We present a scenario which illustrates how the operation G:x↑ψ can be used to model
the dynamic process of acceptance shifting for a group which occurs after some radical
changes in the institutional reality. We model a situation in which the agents in a set G
qua members of an institution x accept a certain fact ϕ and, after some radical changes
in the institution, they start to accept ¬ϕ qua members of the same institution. The
following example was inspired by Tuomela (1992, p. 285).
At the end of the 1980s, before the collapse of communist countries, the Communist
Party of Ruritania accepted that capitalist countries will soon perish. This means that
the agents in G, qua members of the Communist Party of Ruritania (CPR), accept that
capitalist countries will perish (ccwp). Thus, formally:
¬AG:CPR⊥ ∧ AG:CPRccwp.
At a certain point communist countries collapse. After this radical transformation
in the institutional reality, the members of the Communist Party of Ruritania change
their interpretation of the situation by starting to accept that capitalist countries will
flourish. This social phenomenon can be modeled as a case of acceptance shift of the
agents in G to ¬ccwp in the institutional context CPR. After this acceptance shift, the
agents in G accept that ¬ccwp qua members of the Communist Party of Ruritania.
That is, the following formula is valid in DAL:
¬Uccwp → [G:CPR↑¬ccwp](¬AG:CPR⊥ ∧ AG:CPR¬ccwp).
According to this validity, if it is not universally true that ccwp (capitalist countries
will perish) then, after the group G of members of the Communist Party of Ruritania
shifts its acceptance to ¬ccwp, the agents in G start to accept that ¬ccwp qua members
of the Communist Party of Ruritania.
4.4 Completeness of dynamic acceptance logic
In the sequel, we show that the reduction axioms together with the rule of replacement
of equivalents provide a complete axiomatisation for DAL. But first, an expressiveness
result.
Proposition 8 For every DAL formula ϕ there is an AL formula ϕ′ such that |DAL
ϕ ↔ ϕ′.
Proof The proof goes just as for dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. Kooi 2007): each
of the above DAL valid equivalences RA.2–RA.5 and RS.2–RS.6, when applied from
the left to the right, yields a simpler formula, where ‘simpler’ roughly speaking means
that the dynamic operator is pushed inwards; and such equivalences exist for every
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combination of dynamic operator with the AL connectives. Once the dynamic operator
attains an atom it is eliminated by one of the equivalences RA.1 or RS.1. One may
therefore start with the innermost dynamic operator and eliminate it. Iterating this one
can eliminate all dynamic operators, resulting in an equivalent AL formula. unionsq
Theorem 12 The formulae that are valid in DAL models are completely axiomatized
by the axioms and inference rules of AL together with the reduction axioms of Theorems
5 and 9 and the rule of replacement of equivalents.
Proof This a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3 and Proposition 8, together
with the fact that DAL is a conservative extension of AL. unionsq
4.5 Comparison with AGM revision operations
Let us briefly sketch the relationship of our logic DAL with AGM belief revision oper-
ations. Our exposition parallels Segerberg’s recasting of belief revision in dynamic
doxastic logic DDL (Segerberg 1995, 1999).
We consider a belief revision operation  mapping couples of Boolean formulae to
Boolean formulae, following the presentation of Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992). The
basic AGM postulates are then:
(R1) ϕ  ψ | ψ ;
(R2) if ϕ | ¬ψ then ϕ  ψ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ ;
(R3) if ϕ  ψ | ⊥ then ψ | ⊥;
(R4) if | ϕ ↔ ϕ′ and | ψ ↔ ψ ′ then | ϕ  ψ ↔ ϕ′  ψ ′.
Our aim is to show that belief revision operations can be recast in DAL. To that
end, let us add to DAL the dynamic logic operators of test ‘?’, sequencing ‘;’ and
nondeterministic choice ‘∪’. These operators are standard in propositional dynamic
logic PDL (Harel 1984; Harel et al. 2000). Here they combine the dynamic modali-
ties of acceptance and shift in order to form more complex events: ‘ψ?’ denotes the
test of ψ ; ‘α;β’ denotes the execution of α and β in sequence; and ‘α ∪ β’ denotes
nondeterministic choice between α and β, where α and β are either announcements
or shifts. As usually done in PDL, we define the following:
• [α;β]ϕ def= [α][β]ϕ;
• [ψ?]ϕ def= ψ → ϕ;
• [α ∪ β]ϕ def= [α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ;
• if ψ then α else β def= (ψ?;α) ∪ (¬ϕ?;β).
Let us now abbreviate
i:x  ψ def= if ̂Ai:xψ then x !ψ else i:x↑ψ
This event checks whether ψ is consistent with i’s acceptances in x ; if this is the case
then an announcement of ψ takes place, and if not then a shift towards ψ is performed.
In this way we approximate the behavior of a revision operation, which according to
(R2) just adds ψ when it is consistent, and performs a genuine revision else.
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In the rest of the section we are going to show that i:x ψ obeys principles that are
similar to the AGM postulates: checking whether ϕ  ψ | χ can be approximated in
DAL by checking whether
Ai:xϕ → [i:x  ψ]Ai:xχ
is a DAL theorem, for some fixed agent i and context x . The basic AGM postulates
can then be recast in DAL as follows.
Proposition 9 Let ϕ and ψ be Boolean. Then:
(R1′) |DAL Ai:xϕ → [i:x  ψ]Ai:xψ;
(R2′) |DAL (Ai:xϕ ∧ ̂Ai:xψ) → [i:x  ψ]Ai:x (ϕ ∧ ψ);
(R3′) |DAL [i:x  ψ]Ai:x⊥ → U¬ψ;
(R4′) if |DAL ϕ ↔ ϕ′ and |DAL ψ ↔ ψ ′
then |DAL (Ai:xϕ → [i:x  ψ]Ai:xχ) ↔ (Ai:xϕ′ → [i:x  ψ ′]Ai:xχ).
Proof (R1′) can be shown using the DAL theorems [x !ψ]Ai:xψ and [i:x↑ψ]Ai:xψ
which hold for Boolean ψ .
(R2′) can be proved as follows. First observe that ̂Ai:xψ → ([i:xψ]χ ↔ [x !ψ]χ).
Then use the DAL theorem (Ai:xϕ ∧ ̂Ai:xψ) → [x !ψ]Ai:x (ϕ ∧ ψ) which holds for
Boolean ϕ and ψ .
(R3′) can be proved as follows. First observe that (Ai:x¬ψ ∧ [i:x↑ψ]Ai:x⊥) →
U¬ψ is DAL valid. In fact, Ai:x¬ψ∧[i:x↑ψ]Ai:x⊥ is equivalent to Ai:x¬ψ∧U(ψ →
[G:x↑ψ]⊥) (by reduction Axiom RS.6 and the rule of replacement of equivalents)
which in turn is equivalent to Ai:x¬ψ ∧ U(ψ → ⊥) (by reduction Axioms RS.1
and RS.3 and the rule of replacement of equivalents). The latter implies U¬ψ . Then
observe that (̂Ai:xψ ∧ [x !ψ]Ai:x⊥) → U¬ψ is DAL valid too. In fact, ̂Ai:xψ ∧
[x !ψ]Ai:x⊥ is equivalent to ̂Ai:xψ ∧ Ai:x (ψ → [x !ψ]⊥) (by reduction Axiom RA.5
and the rule of replacement of equivalents) which in turn is equivalent to ̂Ai:xψ ∧
Ai:x (ψ → ⊥) (by reduction Axioms RA.1 and RA.3 and the rule of replacement
of equivalents). The latter is equivalent to ̂Ai:xψ ∧ Ai:x¬ψ which in turn implies ⊥.
Finally, ⊥ implies U¬ψ .
Finally (R4′) holds because the rule of replacement of equivalents preserves DAL
validity. unionsq
Remark Let us stress that just as in Segerberg’s DDL, this is only an approximation
of AGM belief revision. What the above proposition shows is that the latter and our
complex event i:x ψ obey similar principles. However, it does not mean that one can
revise beliefs within DAL. This would contradict Gärdenfors’s impossibility theorem
(Gärdenfors 1988), which says that no conditional operator of the object language can
capture AGM revision (the main reason for that being postulate (R2′) which contains
a metalanguage check of satisfiability). Our result has therefore rather to be compared
to the parallels between AGM belief revision and conditional logics that have been
studied in the literature (Makinson 1993). Note also that we only considered the basic
postulates, and not the extended set of AGM postulates. Finally, what we sketched
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here is not a complete characterization, in the sense that i:x  ψ has other properties
beyond (R1′)–(R4′).
5 Belief and acceptance: discussions and perspectives
In the previous sections we have studied acceptance in isolation. It is now time to
shed light on the logical distinction between acceptance and the classical concept of
belief. In this section we sketch a logic integrating these two concepts, allowing for
yet another modeling of the discursive dilemma, and finally discuss the distinction
between group acceptance and common belief.
5.1 The modal operators of belief and common belief
Consider modal operators of belief Beli , one for every agent i ∈ Agt. Beliϕ reads
‘agent i believes that ϕ is true’. We suppose that these operators are defined as usual
in a KD45 modal logic (Fagin et al. 1995). Thus, Beli satisfies the axioms and rules
of inference of the basic normal modal logic K plus the following three principles:
(DB) ¬(Beliϕ ∧ Beli¬ϕ)
(4B) Beliϕ → Beli Beliϕ
(5B) ¬Beliϕ → Beli¬Beliϕ
Hence an agent cannot have inconsistent beliefs (Axiom DB), and an agent’s beliefs
are positively and negatively introspective (Axioms 4B and 5B).
Traditionally, belief operators are interpreted in models 〈W ,B,V〉 where W is a set
of possible worlds and V is a valuation, and B : Agt → W × W maps every i ∈ Agt
to a relation Bi between possible worlds in W . We write Bi (w) for i’s information
state, i.e. the set of worlds {w′ | 〈w, w′〉 ∈ Bi } that are possible according to i . The
accessibility relations are supposed to be serial,9 transitive10 and Euclidian.11 The
truth condition for the belief operator is:
M, w | Beliϕ iff M, w′ | ϕ for all w′ ∈ Bi (w)
The notion of common belief (or mutual belief) has been extensively studied both
in the computer science literature (Fagin et al. 1995) and in the philosophical literature
(Lewis 1969). Given a set of agents G, CBelGϕ reads “there is a common belief in G
that ϕ” or “the agents in G mutually believe that ϕ”, that is, “everyone in G believes
that ϕ, everyone in G believes that everyone in G believes that ϕ, everyone in G
believes that everyone in G believes that everyone in G believes that ϕ, and so on”.
The common belief of a set of agents G is interpreted in terms of the transitive closure
9 For every w ∈ W ,Bi (w) = ∅.
10 For every w ∈ W , if w′ ∈ Bi (w) then Bi (w′) ⊆ Bi (w).
11 For every w ∈ W , if w′ ∈ Bi (w) then Bi (w) ⊆ Bi (w′).
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B+G = (
⋃
i∈G Bi )+ of the union of the accessibility relations Bi for every agent i ∈ G,
that is:
M, w | CBelGϕ iff M, w′ | ϕ for all w′ ∈ B+G(w)






As shown in Fagin et al. (1995), the KD45-principles for the operators Beli , the K-prin-
ciples for the operators CBelG plus the following axiom schema and rule of inference
provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of individual belief and
common belief:
(FixPoint) CBelCϕ → EBelG(ϕ ∧ CBelGϕ)
(InductionRule) From ϕ → EBelG(ϕ ∧ ψ) infer ϕ → CBelGψ
5.2 Logical relationships between acceptance and individual belief
How could we integrate such modal operators for belief into the logic AL? In particular,
which principles relate acceptance and belief?
To study this we work with models 〈W ,A,B,V〉 where 〈W ,A,V〉 is an acceptance
model, and every Bi is a serial, transitive and Euclidian relation on W . We call the
resulting logic AL+B. We only consider the semantics here, and leave a complete
axiomatization and the study of the mathematical properties of AL+B to future work.
However, we are going to use that AL+B is a conservative extension of both AL and
the logic of belief: all the principles of these logics carry over to AL+B.
We first discuss two basic differences between acceptance and belief: acceptance is
contextual, while belief is not; belief aims at truth, while acceptance does not neces-
sarily so. Moreover, we discuss the possible incompatibility between acceptance and
belief: an agent might believe something while accepting the opposite qua member of
a given institution. Then we consider the public aspect of collective acceptance, i.e.
the agents in G accept ϕ while functioning as members of a certain institution if and
only if the agents in G mutually believe this. Finally, we show how in certain situa-
tions collective acceptances can be built from the expression of unanimous opinions
(beliefs) towards the other members of the institution.
Acceptance is contextual, while belief is not. Although some logical connections
between acceptance and belief exist, belief and acceptance are clearly different con-
cepts in several respects. First of all, an individual belief does not depend on context,
whilst an individual acceptance is a context-dependent attitude which is entertained
by an agent qua member of a given institution (Tuomela 2000; Engel 1998). An agent
can accept a certain fact ϕ in a specific institutional context, and reject the very same
fact in a different institutional context. This is reflected in our logic by the fact that
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acceptance modalities have an institutional context, while doxastic modalities do not.
On the contrary, doxastic modalities are context-independent: there is no parameter
specifying the context in which an agent believes something.
Acceptance and belief might be incompatible. It follows from the preceding that an
agent can privately disbelieve something he accepts while functioning as a member
of a given institution. Formally, Beliϕ ∧ Ai :x¬ϕ is satisfiable. In extreme cases and
as emphasized in Tuomela (1992), a collective acceptance that ϕ by the agents in G
(qua members of a given institution) might be compatible with the fact that none of
the agents in G believes that ϕ (and even that every agent in G believes that ¬ϕ). The
following example, inspired by Tuomela (1992, p. 285), illustrates this point.
Example 13 At the end of the 1980s, the Communist Party of Ruritania accepted that
capitalist countries will soon perish (but none of its members really believed so). This
means that the agents in G accept that capitalist countries will perish (ccwp) qua mem-
bers of the Communist Party of Ruritania (CPR) but nobody in G (privately) believes
this. Thus, formally: ¬AG:CPR⊥ ∧ AG:CPRccwp ∧ ∧i∈G ¬Beli ccwp.
Belief aims at truth, while acceptance does not necessarily so. According to Engel
(1998), a fundamental difference between individual acceptance and belief is that
while belief aims at truth, acceptance does not necessarily so. The former is reflected
by the validity Beli (Beliϕ → ϕ) of the standard logic of belief. In contrast, the for-
mula Beli (Ai :xϕ → ϕ) should not be valid, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that an
agent believes that if he accepts a certain fact ϕ then ϕ is true. To witness, consider
the lawyer who at court accepts his client is innocent, and believes so, i.e. Beli Ai :xϕ,
while privately believing the contrary, i.e.Beli¬ϕ. If Beli (Ai :xϕ → ϕ) was valid then
this would entail Beli Ai :xϕ → Beliϕ by standard principles of normal modal logics,
and such a situation could not be the case. This illustrates that acceptance does not
necessarily aim at truth.
Collective acceptances are public. As emphasized in the philosophical literature
(Gilbert 1989; Tuomela 1992), a collective acceptance of the agents in a set G must
not be confused with (nor reduced to) the sum of the individual acceptances of the
agents in G. On the contrary, when the agents in G accept some fact ϕ to be true qua
members of a certain institution x , it means that every agent in G declares to the other
agents in G that he is willing to accept ϕ qua member of x . It follows that if the agents
in G accept that ϕ while functioning together as members of x then every agent in
G must believe this; and if the agents in G do not accept ϕ qua members of x then
every agent in G must believe this. These interaction properties between acceptance
and belief are formally expressed by the following two axiom schemas.
(PIntrAccept) AG:xϕ → Beli AG:xϕ if i ∈ G
(NIntrAccept) ¬AG:xϕ → Beli¬AG:xϕ if i ∈ G
Semantically, these schemas correspond to the following constraint on the accessibility
relations for belief and acceptance:
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(C.4) w′ ∈ Bi(w) implies AG:x (w) = AG:x (w′) (if i ∈ G)
We can easily prove that under (PIntrAccept) and (NIntrAccept), collective accep-
tance is always shared so much that the agents in G have a collective acceptance that
ϕ if and only if the agents in G mutually believe this. More formally:
Theorem 14 The formulae
AG:xϕ ↔ CBelGAG:xϕ
¬AG:xϕ ↔ CBelG¬AG:xϕ
are provable from the axioms and inference rules of Al+ B together with the interaction
Axioms PIntrAccept and NIntrAccept for acceptance and belief.
Proof This can be proved from the Axiom DB for belief, Axiom FixPoint and rule of
inference InductionRule for common belief, and the interaction Axioms PIntrAccept
and NIntrAccept. unionsq
Hence, accepting (resp. not accepting) a proposition while functioning as members
of an institution is always a mutually believed fact (for the members of the institution)
which is out in the open and that is used by all the members to reason about each other
in the institutional context.
In contrast, the formula Beliϕ → Ai :x Beliϕ should not be valid: one might believe
that ϕ while accepting that ¬ϕ, and even while accepting that Beli¬ϕ. To witness,
consider the lawyer who believes his client is guilty, i.e. Beliϕ, while publicly stating
his intimate conviction that his client is innocent, i.e. Ai :x Beli¬ϕ.
Collective acceptances can be built from the expression of unanimous opinions to the
other members of the institution. The AL Axiom Una: AG:x (
∧
i∈G Ai :xϕ → ϕ) of
Sect. 2.2 explains how collective acceptances can be built from the individual accep-
tances of the members of an institution: for every set of agents G, the agents in G
accept that if each of them individually accepts ϕ qua member of institution x then ϕ
is the case. For example, the judges of a boxing fight accept that if each of them qua
judge accepts that a certain boxer is the winner then this boxer is the winner.
In certain situations the collective acceptance about a certain fact ϕ can be built
from the expression of unanimous opinions (beliefs) about ϕ towards the other mem-
bers of the institution. That is, for certain institutions x , for certain facts ϕ and for
certain sets of agents G the following principle sounds reasonable: the agents in G,
while functioning as members of institution x , accept that if each of them declares
his opinion that ϕ in the institutional context x then ϕ is true. Formally we have the







Example 15 G is the group of WHO (World Health Organization) members who have
to decide whether ‘swine flu’ should be considered to be pandemic. Suppose WHO
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members accept that if each of them expresses the opinion that ‘swine flu’ is pandemic
























By Axiom K for AG:WHO it follows that the WHO members accept that ‘swine flu’
should be considered to be pandemic: AG:WHOpandemic.
This principle can also be used to solve the discursive dilemma, as we show in the
next subsection. However, the formula AG:x (
∧
i∈G Beliϕ → ϕ) should not be taken
as a logical axiom which is valid for every institution x , set of agents G and formula ϕ.
The following example highlights why the formula AG:x (
∧
i∈G Beliϕ → ϕ) cannot
be generalized to all institutions, sets of agents and formulae.
Example 16 Consider the scenario inspired by Piaget (1951) of two children i1 and i2
playing a symbolic game together. The game consists in ‘changing the natural order
of things’ through imagination: the two children accept that a concrete object o is an
object of a certain type T (and use object o as if it was an object of type T ) while
accepting that each of them believes that object o is not an object of type T . For
instance, the two children could accept qua players of the game that a broom is a
horse, i.e.
A{i1,i2}:gamebroomIsHorse ∧ ¬A{i1,i2}:game⊥,
while accepting that each of them believes that the broom is not a horse, i.e.
A{i1,i2}:game(Beli1¬broomIsHorse ∧ Beli2¬broomIsHorse).
The previous two formulae would be inconsistent with the instance
A{i1,i2}:game((Beli1¬broomIsHorse ∧ Beli2¬broomIsHorse) → ¬broomIsHorse)
of the belief counterpart of Axiom Una, which says that the two children accept that
if each of them believes that the broom is not a horse then the broom is not a horse.
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5.3 Scenario IV: acceptance and belief in the discursive dilemma
The distinction between acceptance and belief introduced above allows to revisit the
discursive dilemma. Our exposition formalizes ideas that are also contained in Engel
(1985).
One might observe that in the logical treatment of the discursive dilemma that
we proposed in Sects. 2.3 and 3.3, everything is expressed in the scope of the accep-
tance operator, and there is no difference between the intentional attitude underneath a
judge’s expression of his point of view about the issues act and obl in the context of the
court, and the intentional group attitude about the connection rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl).
In Sect. 2.3 the acceptance modality is applied both to the connection rule and to the
premisses: judges 1, 2 and 3 accept the connection rule CR def= lia ↔ (act ∧ obl), and
judges 1, 2 and 3 accept that Pr.
A different way to model the discursive dilemma is by supposing that what a judge
says in the context of the court about the items act and obl is a belief rather than an
acceptance. For instance, when the first judge declares act ∧ obl to the other judges,
he expresses his beliefs (opinions) about the issue at stake rather than his acceptance
qua member of the court. On the contrary, the rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) is the content
of the three judges’ acceptance. In fact, the rule lia ↔ (act ∧ obl) is something on
which the three judges agree. It is part of the system of rules and norms of the court
which are shared by the three judges, therefore it must be accepted by them.
Let us revisit the discursive dilemma on the basis of this distinction between accep-
tance and belief.
As in Sects. 2.3 and 3.3 we suppose that 1, 2 and 3 qua judges of the court accept
the connection rule: A123:crtCR. Different from the account of the discursive dilemma
proposed in Sects. 2.3 and 3.3, we now suppose that every judge expresses a belief
rather than an acceptance about the issues act and obl:
Pr∗ = Bel1(act ∧ obl) ∧ Bel2(act ∧ ¬obl) ∧ Bel3(¬act ∧ obl)
We reconsider the majority principles PMaj and CMaj accordingly by supposing that
the majority rules on which the three judges agree are applied to beliefs instead of
acceptances. Namely, we suppose that the three judges accept that if the majority of
them believes act (resp. ¬act) then act (resp. ¬act) is true, and if the majority of them
believe obl (resp. ¬obl) then obl (resp. ¬obl) is true.
PMaj∗ =
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli act ∧ Bel j act) → act) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli¬act ∧ Bel j¬act) → ¬act) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli obl ∧ Bel j obl) → obl) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli¬obl ∧ Bel j¬obl) → ¬obl)
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Moreover, we suppose that the three judges accept that if the majority of them believes
lia (resp. ¬lia) then lia (resp. ¬lia) is true.
CMaj∗ =
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli lia ∧ Bel j lia) → lia) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,2,3},i = j
((Beli¬lia ∧ Bel j¬lia) → ¬lia)
We can easily prove that now there is no inconsistency in the situation in which the
majority procedure is applied both to the premises and to the conclusion.
Proposition 10 The formula A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr∗ ∧ PMaj∗ ∧ CMaj∗) ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥ is
satisfiable in AL+B models satisfying (C.4).
On the contrary, A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr∗ ∧ PMaj∗ ∧ CMaj∗) implies that, as an outcome
of their collective judgment, the three judges accept that the defendant is liable.
Proposition 11 The formula A123:crt(CR ∧ Pr∗ ∧ PMaj∗ ∧ CMaj∗) → A123:crt lia is
provable from the axioms and inference rules of AL+B together with the two interac-
tion principles PIntrAccept and NIntrAccept.
Proof From A123:crtPr∗ we infer
A123:crt(Bel1act ∧ Bel2act) ∧ A123:crt(Bel1obl ∧ Bel3obl).
By Axiom K for A123:crt , the latter and A123:crtPMaj∗ together imply
A123:crtact ∧ A123:crtobl
which in turn implies
A123:crt(act ∧ obl).
Again by Axiom K for A123:crt„ the latter and A123:crtCR together imply
A123:crt lia. unionsq
Note that because of the distinction between the belief modality and the acceptance
modality, we cannot infer A123:crt¬lia. Since the connection rule CR is in the scope
of acceptance rather than in the scope of belief and since acceptance and belief are
different kinds of attitudes, a judge cannot use CR in order to make deductions from
his beliefs. Therefore, even though the three judges collectively accept the connection
rule CR qua members of the court (viz. A123:crtCR ∧ ¬A123:crt⊥) and (by the AL
Axioms 4A*, 5A* and IncA,G) they accept that each of them individually accepts it
(viz. A123:crtA1:crtCR, A123:crtA2:crtCR and A123:crtA3:crtCR), they do not necessarily
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accept that judge 2 will use CR in order to conclude that he accepts ¬lia from his
beliefs that act and ¬obl and that judge 3 will use CR in order to conclude that he
accepts ¬lia from his beliefs that ¬act and obl.
In other words, our scenario shows that if the agents accept CR then our analysis in
terms of acceptance and belief yields a premise-based solution. The idea is that (1) the
three judges accept the connection rule, and (2) that they accept what each judge has
openly expressed in the context of the court about the issues act and obl. The contents
of the latter acceptances are the beliefs of each judge about the issues act and obl.
The three judges also accept some majority rules which specify how an agreement
about the issues act, obl and lia can be built from the public expression of individual
beliefs about these issues (PMaj∗ and CMaj∗). After each judge has expressed his
beliefs about the issues act and obl, the three judges apply the majority rules and
they start to accept that act and obl. Then, by the application of the connection rule
lia ↔ (act ∧ obl), they conclude that the defendant is liable.
As the reader may have noticed, this solution to the discursive dilemma based on
the distinction between acceptance and belief is a just a different way to implement
the premise-based procedure discussed in Sect. 2.3. In fact, by distinguishing between
acceptance and belief, majority votes can only be taken on the two issues obl and act
(the premises), but not on the issue lia (the conclusion).
It has to be noted that if CR is something the agents believe then the same analysis
does not help overcome the paradox.
5.4 Collective acceptance versus common belief
As said before, DAL has reduction axioms for all logical operators of AL, both for
individual and collective acceptance. This has to be compared to public announcement
logic with common belief: there, there is no reduction axiom for common belief and
common knowledge (Kooi and van Benthem 2004). Technically, this difference can
be explained by the way the two collective attitudes relate to the individual attitude.
On the one hand, common belief is strongly linked to individual beliefs and can be
semantically reduced to them: common belief of a set of agents G is interpreted by
means of the transitive closure of the union of the accessibility relations associated
to the individual in G. In contrast, collective acceptance of G cannot be reduced to
a composition of individual acceptances of the agents in G: in a model, collective
acceptance cannot be computed from individual acceptances. In other words, collec-
tive acceptance of G entertains a much weaker link with the individual acceptances
of the agents in G than common belief does with individual belief.
This difference is easier to understand with a picture. Let M be the epistemic model
in Fig. 2, and let CBel{i, j} denote the operator of common belief of i and j . Note that
even though M, w | CBel{i, j}(q → [!q]p), we still have M, w | [!q]CBel{i, j} p.
In words, it is not common belief that q implies that p is the case after the public
announcement of q, but after the public announcement of q it is common belief that
p. That is, common belief may appear “out of the blue”: it was not foreseeable by the
agents and just “pops up”.
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Fig. 2 An epistemic model
v
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Fig. 3 The acceptance model
corresponding to the epistemic
model in Fig. 2
v
ij:x
i:x p j:x q
uw
p,q
Now consider the acceptance model corresponding to the model M, as depicted in
Fig. 3. Semantic constraint S.1 obliges the corresponding acceptance model to have
more arrows, in particular, it must have the dashed arrow from w to u labelled by
i j :x . Let M ′ be the model of Fig. 3. We have M ′, w | Ai j :x (q → [x !q]p), and also
M ′, w | [x !q]Ai j :x p. That is, contrary to common belief, common acceptance cannot
just pop up if not previously foreseen by the agents.
Nonetheless, the reduction Axiom RA.5 is an intuitive property of collective accep-
tance. This is due to the fact that, differently from the standard notions of common
belief and common knowledge, collective acceptance entails an aspect of mutual iden-
tification and recognition with respect to an institution, group, team, organization,
etc. Consider for instance the left to right direction of the reduction Axiom RA.5.
When the agents in a set G identify themselves with institution x and recognize
each other as members of x , they accept certain rules and principles to stand for
the rules and principles of the institution. That is, the agents in G share a com-
mon body of rules and principles. Among these shared rules and principles, there
are the rules and principles which describe how the world should evolve when an
announcement occurs. They govern how the acceptance of the members of the institu-
tion will be changed after an announcement. Suppose that a certain fact ψ is publicly
announced, and that after this announcement, the agents in G accept ϕ, while iden-
tifying themselves with an institution x and recognizing each other as members of
this institution: [x !ψ]AG:xϕ. This collective acceptance of the agents in G is not cre-
ated from scratch after the announcement of ψ . On the contrary, the creation of this
acceptance is determined by what the agents in G accepted before the announce-
ment as a principle of institution x . In particular, the creation of G’s acceptance
that ϕ rests on the fact that, before ψ is announced, the agents in G, while iden-
tifying themselves and recognizing each other as members of x , accept a principle
saying that “if ψ is true then, after ψ is announced, ϕ will be true”: AG:x (ψ →
[x !ψ]ϕ).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a dynamic acceptance logic (DAL), which is an extension
of the acceptance logic presented in Gaudou et al. (2008) and Lorini et al. (2009)
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by public announcements and acceptance shifts. The public announcement x !ψ is an
event that results in all agents learning that ψ is true in context x , while the shift
G:x↑ψ is an event that results in the acceptance of ψ by the agents in G, in context
x . In DAL, collective acceptances are related to individual acceptances, but they are
not computed from them. This contrasts with epistemic logics where the concepts of
common knowledge and common belief are completely defined in terms of individual
knowledge and belief. Due to this difference it is possible to have reduction axioms
for collective acceptances, while it is known to be impossible for common knowledge.
Still, we argue that this is an intuitive feature of collective acceptance. In the last part
of the paper we discuss the extension of acceptance logic with belief modalities and an
analysis of the logical relationships between acceptance and belief in that framework.
We believe that the formal logic that we have designed is useful to understand and
discuss the informal ideas that can be found in the existing literature on the concepts
of acceptance and its relation to belief.
While acceptance logic and its dynamic version DAL have an interest in themselves,
we have also shown that such a logic provides a suitable framework for analyzing issues
involving judgement aggregation, such as the discursive dilemma analyzed in Sects.
2.3, 3.3 and 5.3. We have first provided a static analysis of the discursive dilemma in
the acceptance logic AL. Then we have shown that it can be analyzed from a dynamic
perspective in acceptance logic with announcements DAL. Finally we have revisited
the discursive dilemma on the basis of the distinction between acceptance and belief.
Future works will be devoted to integrate modalities expressing agents’ goals and
preferences, such as the ones provided in Cohen and Levesque (1990) and van Benthem
and Liu (2007), into the logical framework presented in this article. This is in order to
investigate an agent’s decision whether to join a given institution or not. These kinds
of decisions are indeed influenced by the inconsistency between the agent’s goals and
the current facts accepted by the members of the institution. For instance, if the agent’s
goals conflict with the facts accepted by the members of the institution then, the agent
will probably decide not to join the institution.
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